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Introduction
The Commissioner of Inland Revenue1 (the Commissioner) is an officer of the Crown,2
charged by statute with the function of care and management of taxes3 on behalf of the
Crown.4
In carrying out his statutory function of collecting taxation revenue,5 the
Commissioner is legally obliged to fulfil this role by collecting over time the highest net
revenue that is practicable within the law, in relation to the resources available, the
importance of promoting taxpayer compliance and the compliance cost of taxpayers.6 It is
pursuant to the exercise of this statutory discretion that the Commissioner is authorised to
enter arrangements with taxpayers or their agents for the eventual payment of taxation
indebtedness. Such arrangements may include agreements between the Commissioner
and taxpayer for the payment of taxation debts by instalments. Worth noting however, is
that the Commissioner has recently demonstrated a willingness, not only to accept
 solicitors’ personal undertakings for the payment of tax debts, but to enforce them when
solicitors have chosen to dishonour them.
The recent decision of the New Zealand High Court,7 the concurring decision on
appeal by the New Zealand Court of Appeal8 and the unsuccessful opposition to the
13
1 The Commissioner of Inland Revenue is a creature of statute and is so designated pursuant to s 6A(1) of the Tax
Administration Act 1994 (TAA) and s 31(2) of the State Sector Act 1988. For the appointment of the
Commissioner, see s 35 of the State Sector Act 1988.
2 Cates v C of IR [1982] 1 NZLR 530.
3 Section 6A(2) of the TAA 1994. In NZ Stock Exchange v CIR; National Bank of NZ Ltd v CIR (1990) 12 NZTC
7068 at 7073, Jeffries J noted that the ability of the Commissioner to fulfil his obligations to administer and
enforce Revenue Acts was essential to a government and society.
4 In Reckitt and Coleman (New Zealand) Ltd v Taxation Board of Review [1966] NZLR 1032 at 1038, North P
expressed the view that the Commissioner collects income tax for and on behalf of the Crown.
5 In the context of the English taxation system, Bingham LJ in R v Board of IR ex parte MFK Underwriting Agencies
[1990] 1 All ER 91 at 110 observed that: ‘Every ordinarily sophisticated taxpayer knows that the Revenue is a
tax collecting agency, not a tax-imposing authority.’
6 Section 6A(3) TAA 1994.
7 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Manu Chotubhai Bhanabhai & Ors (2005) 22 NZTC 19,533 (HC).
8 Bhanabhai & Anor v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2007) 23 NZTC 21,155(CA).
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Commissioner’s application for an order of adjudication in bankruptcy9 for failing to
 honour a solicitor’s personal undertaking, resoundingly demonstrate the effective
enforcement of solicitors’ personal undertakings for payment of taxpayers’ taxation debts
by the Commissioner. The decisions also perhaps illustrate the need for solicitors to exer-
cise much greater care when deciding to provide personal undertakings to the
Commissioner, as they will be relied on and indeed enforced, if necessary, at significant
cost to solicitors.10 The applicant in Bhanabhai sought leave to appeal to New Zealand’s
highest court, the Supreme Court, against the decision of the Court of Appeal, but the
application for leave to appeal was dismissed.11 The Commissioner, as judgment creditor,
then filed a bankruptcy petition against Mr Bhanabhai as judgment debtor, seeking an
order of adjudication. The Commissioner’s bankruptcy petition was based on a bank-
ruptcy notice that had been served on the judgment debtor. The bankruptcy notice in
turn, relied on the High Court order for compensation that was subsequently upheld on
appeal, but which the taxpayer had failed to pay.
These decisions found the judgment debtor to have acted in breach of his personal
undertaking to pay the taxation debts of two corporate taxpayers. It was because of this
breach and the impossibility of performing the undertaking, that led to a High Court order
for compensation. Mr Bhanabhai applied for a court order, dismissing the Commissioner’s
application for an order of adjudication, but this was dismissed,12 thereby enabling the
Commissioner to proceed to obtain an order adjudicating Mr Bhanabhai bankrupt.
The Bhanabhai compendium of decisions is significant for a number of reasons.
These include the propriety of judgment calls that are made by solicitors each day as a
matter of routine legal practice, to give personal undertakings to facilitate the near seam-
less conclusion of transactions, including those which are commercial in nature.13 The
 lesson to be learnt from Bhanabhai, is that quite serious consequences will inevitably
 follow for a solicitor who provides a personal undertaking without thoroughly thinking
through the ramifications of doing so. The consequences include irreparable damage to
one’s personal as well as professional reputation and also the serious risk posed to the
ongoing viability of one’s own legal practice, which in turn can significantly impact on a
solicitor’s livelihood.
The Bhanabhai decisions are resoundingly clear; that it can be professionally suicidal
to merely go through the motions of providing a personal undertaking without simulta-
neously matching it with nothing less than a genuine attempt to exercise one’s best
endeavours to honour it to the letter. This is especially so when the personal undertaking
involves the payment of large sums of money and the beneficiary happens to be none
other than the Commissioner of Inland Revenue, a very powerful officer of the Crown,
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9 Bhanabhai v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2009) 24 NZTC 23,126.
10 In terms of the significant cost to solicitors if found to have breached their personal undertakings, not only are
they vulnerable to an order that the undertakings be fulfilled, but also to pay the costs of proceedings to enforce
the undertaking as Hamilton J ordered in United Mining and Finance Corporation Ltd v Becher [1910] 2 KB 296 at
306. In the New Zealand Court of Appeal decision in Harley v McDonald [1999] 3 NZLR 545 at 548, the court
expressed the view that its inherent jurisdiction extended to imposing costs on solicitors that resulted from their
misconduct.
11 Bhanabhai v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2007) 23 NZTC 21,274.
12 Bhanabhai v C of IR (2009) 24 NZTC 23,126.
13 In Dominion Finance Group Ltd (in receivership and in liquidation) v Dyson Smythe & Gladwell (2010) 24 NZTC
24,330 at 24,340, Associate Judge Doogue commented that: ‘The Courts proceed summarily in order to main-
tain confidence in solicitors’ undertakings and the central part that they play in commercial affairs.’
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who must not be trifled with. The Commissioner’s resounding success at every stage of
the litigation in Bhanabhai has immeasurably imbued the Commissioner with confidence
as to the effectiveness of accepting solicitors’ personal undertakings. Bhanabhai not only
amply demonstrates the determination of the Commissioner, endowed with vast
resources of the State, to enforce the undertaking, but also provides valuable insight into
the attitude of the courts to the enforcement of them. The courts’ approach indicates
 little, if any, empathy with the plight of a solicitor who fails to honour such an under -
taking, particularly where such failure would enable the solicitor to take advantage by
profiting from his or her own wrong.
In addition to the Commissioner invoking the inherent supervisory jurisdiction of
the High Court over solicitors to enforce such undertakings, there is the option of
enforcement through the disciplinary procedures of the New Zealand Law Society. The
Bhanabhai decisions clearly demonstrate that any limitations on the Law Society’s capa city
to enforce such undertakings or to direct the payment of compensation in lieu will not in
any way inhibit the exercise of the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction. A solicitor can no
longer seek refuge behind a Law Society Tribunal finding of misconduct for dishonour-
ing a personal undertaking, in order to avoid the exercise of the High Court’s inherent
supervisory jurisdiction. This is especially so when the Law Society’s Disciplinary
Tribunal has either not enforced the undertaking or not directed that compensation be
paid in lieu. This legal position appears to have been considerably fortified by the recent
enactment of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006.
The Bhanabhai decisions serve as a watershed in the law on solicitors’ personal
undertakings. They serve as a salient reminder of the seriousness with which undertakings
are entered into generally as a matter of law, but particularly in the context of meeting
taxation obligations, including indebtedness for tax. Any attempt to subsequently deny or
lessen the import of an undertaking after it has been given and accepted by the respective
parties to it, will be vigorously resisted in the interests of maintaining confidence in the
legal process and the legal profession. Bhanabhai emphatically demonstrates a reinvigo-
rated affirmation of the adage that ‘a solicitor’s word is his or her bond’.
The legal development in Bhanabhai, although of direct relevance to New Zealand,
would be of wider interest, particularly in comparable jurisdictions to New Zealand’s. It
would be of interest to those jurisdictions where taxation obligations are taken seriously
and the consequences of not complying with them are quite severe. Secondly, it will be
of interest in jurisdictions where the legal profession has continued to embrace standards
that are increasingly being enforced. It is such jurisdictions which share a common legal
tradition and which prescribe exacting standards for members of the legal profession, that
will find Bhanabhai a useful addition to the jurisprudence on professional standards and
conduct expected of those in the profession.
Bhanabhai serves as a stark reminder of the imperative for vigilance by barristers and
solicitors in continually upholding the highest standards expected of them as officers of
the court. Such standards must be upheld even at the cost of a solicitor’s personal interest.
These standards reflect a common thread evident from the earliest point in time when a
candidate seeks to qualify for admission as a barrister and solicitor of the High Court, such
as in New Zealand. A person qualifies for admission as a barrister and solicitor not only by
meeting academic qualifications but also by satisfying the requirements of otherwise being
a fit and proper person to be admitted to the profession. The standards of probity which
are required appear to be uniform in the legal profession that has developed on the
English model, particularly in numerous Commonwealth jurisdictions.
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While the standards appear to be uniform, the manner in which they are enforced
appears to indicate subtle differences. In the English Court of Appeal decision in R & T
Thew Ltd v Reeves (No 2),14 Lord Denning MR commented on the disciplinary jurisdic-
tion of the court being able to be exercised in two ways: either by punishing the solicitor
or alternatively by making the solicitor pay compensation.15 In terms of the punitive juris-
diction, the court would strike a solicitor off the roll of court or suspend the solicitor from
practice. As far as the compensatory jurisdiction was concerned, the court could order the
solicitor to pay costs and these could be the costs of his own client, at times those of the
opposing party, or on occasion both sets of costs. Lord Denning MR emphasised that in
the English system, the punitive jurisdiction of the court was rarely, if ever, exercised.
This was because it was a matter that was routinely referred to the Solicitors Disciplinary
Tribunal to deal with. If a judge considered that a solicitor was guilty of conduct war-
ranting the exercise of the punitive jurisdiction, the judge would report the matter to the
Law Society. On the other hand, the compensatory jurisdiction was one which the courts
retained in order to exercise themselves. This was because the Solicitors Disciplinary
Tribunal did not have statutory authority to award compensation to any injured party.
This suggests that the way in which the disciplinary jurisdiction is exercised over
solicitors has parallels with New Zealand. The statutory jurisdiction exercised by the pro-
fessional body of solicitors is permitted to take its course. Where it encounters limitations,
such as by not being able to award any compensation to anyone, as in the English system,
or in not being able to exercise the insolvency jurisdiction as is the case in New Zealand,
the inherent jurisdiction is invoked to overcome any statutory limitations in the discipli-
nary procedure. However, in awarding compensation, there does not appear to have been
any development in England akin to that in Bhanabhai, where it has led to the adjudica-
tion in bankruptcy of a solicitor for failing to honour a personal undertaking. This is not
to say that in an appropriate case, the English will not seek to at least consider the deci-
sion in Bhanabhai. The result in Bhanabhai will have significant appeal to the taxation
authorities in England, particularly as a more effective enforcement option for tax debts.
Bhanabhai would be of interest in Australia as well, where despite differences in the
law between England and Australia, the inherent jurisdiction of the courts to exercise
supervision over solicitors has been recognised. In the New South Wales Supreme Court
decision in Wade v Licardy,16 Bryson J of the Equity Division held that although there were
differences in procedural law between England and New South Wales:
‘I am of the view that there is a strong basis for contending that the summary
jurisdiction to enforce solicitors’ undertakings, whether in respect of litigation
or otherwise in respect of their professional conduct, exists in New South
Wales. In my view there is no reason why such jurisdiction would not have
been conferred on this Court by s 3 and s 24 of the Act 9 George IV Ch
83(UK) and by s 23 of the Supreme Court Act 1970.’
Professional Negligence, Vol. 27 No. 1, 2011
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14 [1982] 3 All ER 1086.
15 Ibid at 1088.
16 (1993) 33 NSWLR 1 at 9.
01-Prof Negligence-27.1 text-cpp:01-Prof Negligence-27.1 text-ppp  7/3/11  17:26  Page 16
However, even in Australia, it appears that the court’s inherent supervisory jurisdiction
operates in tandem with any statutory regulation of solicitors’ conduct. In the Australian
High Court decision in Weaver v Law Society of New South Wales,17 which concerned a dis-
ciplinary matter in relation to a solicitor of the Supreme Court of New South Wales,
Mason J said that the proceedings were the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of that
court. Pursuant to s 79 of the Legal Practitioners Act 1898 (NSW), the disciplinary jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court over solicitors had been preserved in much the same way as
had occurred by s 120 of New Zealand’s Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006.
Although there does not appear to have been any development in Australia similar
to that in Bhanabhai, there is certainly scope for the courts to exercise their supervisory
jurisdiction should a situation arise similar to that in Bhanabhai. The New Zealand and
Australian tax laws have many common features and the development in Bhanabhai would
be of interest among law practitioners in Australia as well as within the Australian Tax
Office, as the tax collector.
Finally, it would appear that Bhanabhai would be of interest in the Canadian juris-
diction. The practical importance of solicitors’ undertakings in the Canadian context was
commented on in Bogoroch & Associates v Sternberg,18 a decision of the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice (Divisional Court) as follows:
‘Solicitors’ undertakings are matters of utmost good faith. They are tradition-
ally given to expedite and facilitate the furtherance or conclusion of matters
upon which solicitors are engaged on behalf of their clients. These efficiencies
result in savings of lawyers’ time that can be passed on to clients. Time is spent
more efficiently and work is done more smoothly. Because of that, solicitors
must be able to rely upon undertakings, which are promises given by one
solicitor to another to do or to refrain from doing an act.’
Furthermore, the decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Law Society (Manitoba) v
McRoberts19 illustrates that the enforcement of solicitors’ personal undertakings will follow
where there has been a breach. It concerned an appeal against a charge by the Law Society
of Manitoba. The charge was in respect of professional misconduct by Mr McRoberts in
failing in his duty to account to a client and in failing to comply with an undertaking to
account that had been given to the court at the time Mr McRoberts withdrew as  counsel
for the client. Mr McRoberts had been convicted by the Judicial Committee of the Law
Society on both counts.
While the giving and enforcement of solicitors’ personal undertakings is very much
a pivotal part of professional legal practice in Canada, there does not appear to be any
decision that has sought enforcement of undertakings to the extent as found in Bhanabhai.
In addition to the legal profession, the tax authority in Canada is highly likely to find the
Bhanabhai decision of particular interest.
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17 [1979] 142 CLR 201 at 207.
18 (2007) 229 OAC 284.
19 (1990) 63 Man R (2d) 310.
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The case of Bhanabhai and the contest for the
enforcement of solicitors’ personal undertakings to meet
taxation obligations
The recent decisions in Bhanabhai illustrate rather well the seriousness with which solici-
tors’ personal undertakings to the Commissioner, for the payment of taxation related
debts, will be taken. In Bhanabhai,20 the Commissioner as plaintiff sought to recover goods
and services tax(gst) payments, pursuant to a solicitor’s personal undertaking that had been
given by the defendants, who were barristers and solicitors practising in Auckland, New
Zealand, under the name of Dyer Whitechurch & Bhanabhai.
The defendants had acted for two associated limited liability companies,21 which had
been jointly involved in a project to construct and manage a block of residential apart-
ment units in Hobson Street, Auckland, New Zealand. The project failed before its com-
pletion and both companies were placed in liquidation by 10 June 1999. Prior to this date
the companies had incurred a gst debt of over $500,000 to the plaintiff Commissioner,
which remained outstanding. This related to the gst that was payable by the companies on
the sales of fourteen of the residential apartment units. In fact the gst output tax was
payable to the Commissioner at the time that the purchasers of the units had paid the
deposit. The two companies, however, did not pay the gst output tax at the time when
the respective deposits were paid.
Due to the default by the companies in meeting their gst output tax obligations, the
plaintiff, in April 1997, entered into an agreement with the two companies, pursuant to
which, payment of the outstanding gst would be deferred pending the actual settlement
of the sales of the apartment units that were created pursuant to the project. The agree-
ment was, however, conditional, in that the defendants, who acted for the companies,
would be required to provide an undertaking to the plaintiff 22 to pay the outstanding gst
which was due in respect of sales of the apartment units on the settlement of those sales.
The defendants duly provided a written undertaking by letter on their law firm
 letterhead, dated 17 April 1997, signed by the first defendant solicitor, a Mr Bhanabhai
and which provided as follows:
‘We are the solicitors for Golden Gate Holdings Ltd. We have been instructed
to settle the sale of the units in the development and we undertake that on
 settlement of units 3F, 5A, B, C, D, E, F, 6A, B, C, D, E & F, we will forth-
with pay to you the GST component of the sale consideration.’
Professional Negligence, Vol. 27 No. 1, 2011
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20 (2005) 22 NZTC 19,533.
21 The first of which was Golden Gate Holdings Ltd (GGH) which had purchased land for the development of
that site for apartments by an associated company, Nautilus Developments Ltd (‘NDL’).
22 Laurenson J in C of IR v Manu Chotubhai Bhanabhai (2005) 22 NZTC 19,533 at 19,545–19,546 commented on
the significance of the undertaking to the plaintiff Commissioner as follows:
‘I have no doubt that the CIR saw the obtaining of the personal undertaking from the defendants as an essen-
tial element of the agreement. It was the undertaking which effectively guaranteed the payment of the GST
… A solicitor’s undertaking was required as something which would provide an assurance of payment.’
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It is important to note that the undertaking was required to be made in circumstances
where the two developer companies had already breached their legal obligations in
respect of the payment of gst output tax.23
The sale of the relevant residential apartment units occurred and the defendants’ law
firm settled the sales of the units in question. However, the undertaking to pay a sum of
over $500,000, which was the gst component on settlement of the respective sales, was
not honoured. As a consequence, the Commissioner, as plaintiff, issued proceedings in
the New Zealand High Court against the solicitor and his partner, claiming that the  letter
of 17 April 1997 was an undertaking to pay the required sum of money. The
Commissioner was of the view that the letter amounted to a personal undertaking by the
defendants as solicitors to account to the Commissioner for gst on the sales of the respec-
tive apartment units, referred to in the 17 April 1997 letter, when those respective sales
were settled. Since the defendants had not accounted for gst pursuant to their personal
undertaking, the plaintiff proceeded to seek an order from the High Court, compelling
the defendants to honour the undertaking24 to pay the gst or, alternatively, an order for
compensation for the equivalent sum.
The defendants denied that they had assumed any liability under the personal under-
taking, on a number of grounds. First, they claimed that the Commissioner was stopped
from enforcing the undertaking due to the terms of a settlement that had been reached
between the liquidator of the companies and the directors of these same companies.
Secondly, they claimed that the undertaking was for a limited period pending settlement
of the sales by a particular date, namely by the end of June 1997. As the settlements in
question were delayed because the defendants’ clients and the Commissioner chose to
delay the date for payment, without the consent of the defendants, the defendants argued
that it followed that they were released from their undertaking as from the end of June
1997. Thirdly, the defendants had claimed that the undertaking had been given on behalf
of the two companies and not by them, in their personal capacity as solicitors. Finally, the
defendants had argued that the undertaking had been made conditional on sufficient funds
being made available after payments had been made, including those to the company that
had been the principal lender to the development project.
Laurenson J, presiding in the High Court, addressed each of these defences in turn
and concluded that:
‘None of the defences put forward have succeeded.’25
On the facts in Bhanabhai, an undertaking had been given by the defendants to the
Commissioner, but its legal effect had been vigorously contested by the parties to the
undertaking. It becomes important, therefore, to briefly examine relevant aspects of the law
on undertakings which would also provide insight into the reasons why the Commissioner
succeeded in enforcing it, as none of the defendant’s defences had succeeded.
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23 Bhanabhai C of IR (2007) 23 NZTC 21,274 at 21,275.
24 It appears that there was a six year time lapse from when the undertaking had been breached, until the point in
time when the Commissioner served notice to enforce the undertaking – see Bhanabhai v C of IR (2009) 24
NZTC 23,126 at 23,131.
25 Supra note 7 (2005) 22 NZTC 19,533 at 19,553.
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The nature and legal effect of solicitors’ undertakings
In ordinary language, an undertaking amounts to a promise to assume responsibility for
ensuring that a task is completed or that various requirements or expectations are satis-
fied within an agreed time frame. Thus there is the consensual nature of an undertaking
in that the party providing it agrees to be bound by its terms, while the beneficiary
agrees to accept it. It could also be said that an undertaking in general terms may be
similar to what may be termed ‘a gentleman’s agreement’.26 This is because the expecta-
tions of both  parties are that the undertaking will be honoured as a matter of good faith
or morality.
However, should an undertaking not be met or be dishonoured, neither party
would feel obliged as a matter of law to enforce it. Of more significance and greater prac-
tical effect, however, is the provision of solicitors’ undertakings.27
Types of solicitors’ undertakings
There appear to be at least two kinds of solicitors’ undertakings,28 one of which appears
far less onerous on solicitors than the other. First, there is the solicitor’s undertaking given
on behalf of a client. Such an undertaking merely serves as an assurance, to a third party,
that the solicitor’s client will perform or make good on an obligation. The solicitor, in
conveying the undertaking, merely acts as the client’s agent or conduit, as for all intents
and purposes the undertaking is the client’s and the client’s alone. However, should the
client choose not to act in accordance with the undertaking, the solicitor will not be held
liable. This is because the undertaking would be one which the solicitor’s client would be
obliged to honour, rather than the client’s solicitor. It was precisely this kind of under-
taking that the defendants in Bhanabhai had unsuccessfully argued they had given to the
Commissioner, in their third ground for denying liability for the undertaking that they
had given.
Secondly, there is the solicitor’s personal undertaking.29 It is personal in the sense
that the solicitor, acting in a professional capacity, personally assumes responsibility for
carrying out an act or meeting an obligation. As was articulated by Fisher J in the New
Zealand High Court decision in Australian Guarantee Corporation (NZ) Ltd v East Brewster
Urquhart & Partners:30
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26 The New Zealand Oxford Paperback Dictionary defines ‘gentleman’s agreement’ as one that is regarded as
binding in honour but not enforceable at law.
27 The CCH Macquarie Dictionary of Law (rev ed, CCH, 1996) at p 175 defines ‘undertaking’ as, ‘[A] promise,
pledge or guarantee, especially made by a party in the course of legal proceedings’.
28 In the English Court of Appeal decision in Udall v Capri Lighting Ltd [1988] 1 QB 907 at 920, Kerr LJ com-
mented on the evidence required to establish that an undertaking had been given. When undertakings are given
orally, most solicitors would no doubt agree that as a matter of normal good practice, oral undertakings should
be confirmed in writing. The issue of whether there was evidence on which a finding could be made that the
defendant solicitor had given an undertaking to the plaintiff and whether it was given by him in his capacity as
a solicitor, arose for determination in John Fox v Bannister King & Rigbeys [1988] 1 QB 925n.
29 Richardson J in Gill & McAsey v Wainui Timber [1992] 1 NZLR1 at 4 encapsulated the essence of such an
undertaking in the following comments: ‘The essential point of a primary undertaking is that it is a distinct
promise or engagement. It is not a guarantee. It is not necessarily dependent for its content or enforceability on
the terms or validity of the contract between the person to whom the undertaking is given and the third party.’
30 [1990] 2 NZLR 167 at 171.
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‘An undertaking for this purpose must be a personal undertaking given by the
solicitor in his professional capacity.31 It is not sufficient if the undertaking is
merely given on behalf of a client or if it is given by a solicitor in some capa -
city other than a solicitor.’
It is also worth noting in respect of solicitors’ personal undertakings, that the law does not
require the beneficiary of the undertaking to have provided consideration for it, in order
to establish that it had been validly given. As highlighted by Sir John Donaldson MR in
John Fox v Bannister:32
‘[I]t is no answer to a complaint that a solicitor acted in breach of an under-
taking given by him that there was no consideration for it.’
More importantly however, where a solicitor provides a personal undertaking and chooses
not to honour it,33 the New Zealand High Court, in its supervisory jurisdiction of solici-
tors can, in an appropriate case, intervene and order the solicitor to honour the under-
taking. Alternatively, and in lieu of enforcing the undertaking, the High Court may order
that compensation be paid by the solicitor who has acted in breach of the undertaking that
caused loss34 or injury to the party who has acted in reliance on the undertaking. As
observed by Lord Wright in Myers v Elman,35 the courts retain a discretion as to the type
of relief that is to be granted. In cases where it may be inappropriate for the court to make
an order compelling compliance by a solicitor with an undertaking on grounds of impos-
sibility of performance for instance, the court may instead order the solicitor to compen-
sate a party who has suffered loss as a consequence of failure to honour the undertaking.
The courts have been resolute in their demands for a much higher standard of
 conduct from solicitors36 in relation to their personal undertakings than from other pro-
fessionals.37 The reason for this, is that solicitors are first and foremost officers of the High
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31 In United Mining and Finance Corporation Ltd v Becher [1910] 2 KB 296 at 307, Hamilton J discussed the meaning
of the phrase ‘in his capacity as a solicitor’ as follows:
‘Whatever that expression may mean, I think it must at least go as far as this, that when a solicitor, in the
course of business which he is conducting for clients with third parties in the way of his profession, gives an
undertaking to those third parties incidental to those negotiations, that undertaking is one which is given in
his capacity as a solicitor and not as a mere layman undertaking the office of stakeholder or guaranteeing the
payment of money’.
32 [1988] 1 QB 925n at 931. Sir John Donaldson MR referred to United Mining and Finance Corporation Ltd v Becher
[1910] 2 KB 296 at 303 as authority in support of the proposition.
33 Choosing not to honour an undertaking is in marked contrast to a solicitor who cannot honour it. Sir John
Vinelott in A Ltd v B Ltd [1996] 1 WLR 665 at 674, expressed the view that:
‘the Court must be able to have confidence that a solicitor as an officer of the Court will not give an under-
taking which he cannot honour.’
34 In Marsh v Joseph [1897] 1 Ch 213 at 244–245, Lord Russell of Killowen CJ commented that if the misconduct
of the solicitor led to a person suffering loss, then the court had power to order the solicitor to make good the
loss caused by the solicitor’s breach of duty.
35 [1940] AC 282 at 318.
36 In Countrywide Banking Corporation Ltd v Kingston [1990] 1 NZLR 629 at 640 Wylie J opined: ‘In order to
demonstrate the insistence by the Courts that those standards are to be maintained the disciplining of those who
breach them by ordering performance is a very necessary if regrettable, action to be taken’.
37 In respect of doctors, it had been observed that they had a duty to take care and that such duty existed irrespec-
tive of contract – see Pippin v Shepherd and Everett v Griffiths [1920] 3 KB 163.
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Court38 and in this capacity are expected to adhere to the highest standards of honourable
conduct.39 As observed over a century ago by Lord Asher MR in Re Grey:40
‘the Court has a punitive and disciplinary jurisdiction over solicitors as being
officers of the Court, which is exercised, not for the purpose of enforcing legal
rights,41 but for the purpose of enforcing honourable conduct on the part of the
Crown’s own officers.’
Lord Asher MR further emphasised that the court’s disciplinary jurisdiction operated
quite independently of any legal rights or remedies of the parties and could not be affected
by anything which determined the strict legal rights of the parties.
Such conduct may arise in the context of litigation, in which case it is directly linked
with court processes and procedures. In this context, solicitors will necessarily be directly
accountable to the court in respect of undertakings given which relate to litigation they
may be involved with.
However, even where a solicitor is acting in such a professional capacity but in cir-
cumstances quite unrelated to any litigation, the solicitor will still be expected to honour
any personal undertakings that may have been given. The New Zealand High Court has
also very recently opined as follows:
‘A solicitor’s undertaking will generally be enforced even in circumstances
where there has been no impropriety or misconduct on the part of the
 solicitor.’42
In essence then, the approach of the courts in respect of solicitors’ personal undertakings
is that they must be honoured regardless of whether or not they relate to litigation.43 The
rationale for this consistent approach by the courts was articulated as follows:
Professional Negligence, Vol. 27 No. 1, 2011
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38 In the New Zealand High Court decision in McDonald v FAI (NZ) General Insurance Co Ltd [1999] 1 NZLR
583 at 590 Giles J observed that both barristers and solicitors in New Zealand are officers of the High Court.
This was reaffirmed in the New Zealand Court of Appeal decision in Harley v McDonald [1999] 3 NZLR 545
at 557.
39 In Countrywide Banking Corporation Ltd v Kingston [1990] 1 NZLR 629 at 640, Wylie J observed that to excuse
the solicitor in question from honouring the undertaking would seriously undermine the justifiable claims of the
legal profession to standards of integrity and honourable conduct upon which both the profession and the  public
have constantly to rely. In the earlier decision of National Westminster Finance NZ Ltd v Bryant [1989] 1 NZLR
513 at 518–519, Smellie J also alluded to the importance of enforcing solicitors’ personal undertakings in the
context of standards of the legal profession.
40 [1892] 2 QB 440 at 443.
41 In the earlier decision of Re Hilliard (1845) 14 LJQB 225, Coleridge J commented on the disciplinary jurisdic-
tion as follows: ‘The interference is not so much between party to party to settle disputed rights; as criminally
to punish misconduct or disobedience in its officers.’
42 Dominion Finance Group Ltd (in receivership and in liquidation) v Dyson Smythe & Gladwell (2010) 24 NZTC 24,330
at 24,341.
43 The English Court of Appeal in Udall v Capri Lighting Ltd [1988] 1 QB 907 at 915 articulated the court’s
 summary jurisdiction to enforce solicitors’ personal undertakings as follows: ‘This is exercisable whether or not
there are any proceedings pending in Court and whether or not the undertaking was given in the course of legal
proceedings.’
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‘Undertakings are given by legal practitioners for the specific purpose of enabling
legal activities to be carried out. Other persons rely upon those undertakings.
The undertakings are personal to the legal practitioner and bind that practi-
tioner … as a matter of professional conduct and comity, and will be enforced
by the Courts because legal practitioners are officers of the Court and because
without enforcement undertakings would be worthless, persons and Courts
would be unable to rely on the word of the legal practitioner and this aspect of
legal practice, that demands compliance for legal efficiency, would collapse.’44
The important requirement is that the undertaking must be one which is given by a solic-
itor acting in that capacity. The position was well articulated by Lord Denning MR in
Geoffrey Silver & Drake v Baines45 in the following passage:
‘This court has from time immemorial exercised a summary jurisdiction46 over
solicitors. They are officers of the court47 and are answerable to the court for
anything that goes wrong in the execution of their office. Even if the solicitor
has been guilty of no fault personally, but it is the fault of his clerk, he is
accountable for it … This jurisdiction extends so far that if a solicitor gives an
undertaking in his capacity as a solicitor, the court may order him straightaway
to perform his undertaking. It need not be an undertaking to the court. Nor
need it be given in connection with legal proceedings. It may be a simple
undertaking to pay money, provided always that it is given “in his capacity as
a solicitor” … If such an undertaking is given, the court may summarily make
an order on the solicitor to fulfil his undertaking and, if he then fails to do so,
the court may commit him to prison. Alternatively, if it is an order to pay
money, execution may be levied against his property. This summary jurisdic-
tion means however, that the solicitor is deprived of the advantages which
ordinarily avail a defendant on a trial. There are no pleadings, no discovery;
and no oral evidence save by leave.’48
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44 Vincent Cofini [1994] NSWLST 25 at 6.
45 [1971] 1 All ER 473 at 475.
46 In respect of the summary jurisdiction of the High Court in New Zealand, the New Zealand Court of Appeal
in Harley v McDonald [1999] 3 NZLR 545 commented that: ‘The summary jurisdiction of the High Court to
deal with breaches of duty to the Court does not involve any cause of action vested in a litigant. That is why
the jurisdiction is referred to as summary’ (paragraph 34).
47 In United Mining and Finance Corporation Ltd v Becher [1910] 2 KB 296 at 305, Hamilton J also referred to solic-
itors as officers of the Court. The New Zealand Court of Appeal in Harley v McDonald [1999] 3 NZLR 545 at
557 made the observation that:
‘In New Zealand, both barristers and solicitors are officers of the Court; they are enrolled as “barristers and
solicitors of the Court”: see s 49 of the Law Practitioners Act 1982.’
The Privy Council in Harley v McDonald [2002] 1 NZLR 1 at 22 also commented that:
‘The undoubted inherent jurisdiction of the Court in New Zealand … rests upon the principle that, as
 officers of the Court, solicitors owe a duty to the Court.’
(paragraph 45). Further, s 4(d) of the 2006 Act refers to every lawyer having overriding duties as an officer of
the High Court.
48 The English Court of Appeal in John Fox v Bannister [1988] 1 QB 925 at 930 however, observed that in appro-
priate cases the court could resolve issues of fact with the assistance of cross examination of deponents. Where
necessary, the court could also make orders for discovery and hear argument where there is dispute about the
true construction of a document.
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The nature of the summary jurisdiction that Lord Denning MR in Geoffrey Silver & Drake
alluded to was further elaborated on, in the following passage from the speech of Lord
Wright in the English House of Lords decision of Myers v Elman:49
‘The underlying principle is that the Court has a right and a duty to supervise
the conduct of its solicitors, and visit with penalties any conduct of a solicitor
which is of such a nature as to tend to defeat justice in the very cause in which
he is engaged professionally. … The matter complained of need not be crimi-
nal. It need not involve peculation or dishonesty … The term professional
misconduct has often been used to describe the ground on which the Court
acts. It would perhaps be more accurate to describe it as conduct which
involves a failure on the part of a solicitor to fulfil his duty to the Court and to
realise his duty to aid in promoting in his own sphere the cause of justice. This
summary procedure may often be invoked to save the expense of an action.50
Thus it may in proper cases take the place of an action for negligence, or an
action for breach of warrant of authority brought by the person named as
defendant in the writ. The jurisdiction is not merely punitive but compen-
satory.’
The decisions in Udall v Capri Lighting Ltd 51 and John Fox v Bannister, King and Rigbeys52
illustrate rather well the dual nature of the court’s jurisdiction in dealing with applications
for summary judgment in respect of breaches of solicitors’ undertakings. In Udall it had
been submitted that there were two different jurisdictions which the court exercises in
dealing summarily with solicitors. First, the court had jurisdiction to enforce undertak-
ings. Such jurisdiction could be exercised, whether or not there were any court proceed-
ings and irrespective of whether the undertaking had been given in the course of legal
proceedings. This jurisdiction could still be exercised, even though the solicitor had not
been guilty of dishonourable or discreditable conduct.
It had also been submitted, that the alternative jurisdiction which the court had was
to award compensation. In John Fox v Bannister, the court accepted that the jurisdiction
was disciplinary, in that the undertaking could be enforced against the solicitor that gave
the undertaking.53 This was subject to the practicalities of the solicitor still having it within
his or her own power, to either directly or indirectly perform the act which he or she had
undertaken to do. The jurisdiction was also compensatory, as acknowledged in the deci-
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49 [1940] AC 289 at p 319.
50 This justification for the summary procedure was specifically referred to more recently by Wylie J in
Countrywide Banking Corporation Ltd v Kingston [1990] 1 NZLR 629 at 639 in the following passage:
‘One can infer from the very nature of the undertaking that the purpose of the bank in securing it is to avoid
the necessity of enforcement against the borrower and the guarantors.’
Hamilton J in United Mining and Finance Corporation Limited v Becher [1910] 2 KB 296 at 307 also alluded to the
advantage of enforcing a solicitor’s personal undertaking in lieu of the expense of an action.
In the New Zealand High Court decision in Re: McDougall’s Application [1982] 1 NZLR 141 at 144, Hardie
Boys J also commented on the option exercised by the applicants to have the undertaking enforced instead of
taking proceedings against the vendors.
51 [1988] 1QB 907(CA).
52 [1981] 1QB 925.
53 Ibid at 930.
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sion. If the inquiry that had been ordered had established that the plaintiff had suffered
loss, then despite the fact that the undertaking was impossible to perform (as the funds had
been wrongfully disbursed), the defendant could be ordered to make good the loss
 suffered, pursuant to an order for compensation.54
Laurensen J, in the course of considering the legal effect of the solicitor’s personal
undertaking on the facts in Bhanabhai, gave effect to a number of the principles just out-
lined. In addition, the learned judge referred to the New Zealand Court of Appeal deci-
sion in Gill & McAsey v Wainui Timber Co Ltd 55 in which Richardson J made reference to
the essential elements of an undertaking. These elements being the requirement for a
promise, the subject matter of the promise and the time frame in which the promise must
be honoured. Richardson J’s encapsulation of these ingredients of an undertaking was
expressed as follows:
‘We turn to the substantial question in the case, the construction of the under-
taking. The essential point of a primary undertaking is that it is a distinct
promise or engagement. It is not a guarantee. It is not necessarily dependent
for its content or enforceability on the terms or validity of the contract
between the person to whom the undertaking is given and the third party. The
undertaking in the present case is clear and brief. There is first the promise “we
undertake to pay”, next there is the subject of the promise “all Mr Sinclair’s
bills in connection with the building of his house”; then there is the time when
that obligation is to be performed “on receipt of your delivery dockets”.’56
In applying these principles to the undertaking on the facts in Bhanabhai, Laurenson J in
the High Court judgment observed as follows:
‘I consider there can be little doubt that the letter of 17 April 1997 was an
undertaking. It contained:
[a] A promise as solicitors for GGH who had been instructed to settle the sale
of the units in the development “We undertake that on settlement of units
3F, 5A, B, C, D, E, F, 6A, B, C, D, E & F will forthwith pay”;
[b] The subject matter of the promise – “the GST component of the sale con-
sideration”;
[c] The time when the obligation was to be performed – “On settlement of
(the named units) forthwith”.’57
Having applied the principles to the facts and made the finding that there was an enforce-
able undertaking, the question of its enforcement needed to be dealt with. The
Commissioner had sought an order directing the defendants to pay the gst which they had
undertaken to pay, or damages for the equivalent sum. The High Court as a preliminary
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54 It is worth noting the observations of William Young P in Bhanabhai v C of IR (2007) 23 NZTC 21,155 at
21,163, that the court’s jurisdiction to award compensation has been a relatively recent development.
55 [1992] 1 NZLR 1 (CA).
56 Ibid at p 4.
57 Supra note 26 at p 19, 543.
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matter dealt with its enforcement jurisdiction and established that it had jurisdiction to
enforce solicitors’ undertakings pursuant to its inherent jurisdiction. In relation to
enforcement, the court was clear that an undertaking would not be enforced if it was not
capable of being performed. The defendant solicitors had sought to argue that the under-
taking was not capable of being performed. This was because it had been rendered impos-
sible to pay the gst debt to the plaintiffs, as the proceeds from which it was supposed to
have been paid had long since been disbursed. The defendants had also argued that even
at the point when it was in receipt of the sale proceeds from which the gst could have
been paid, there were insufficient funds from which the debt could have been paid and
for this additional reason it could be said that the undertaking was impossible of perfor-
mance. Laurenson J agreed that it was impossible to pay the gst claimed from the sale
 proceeds received on settlement, as those monies had long gone. However, quite apart
from the physical impossibility of paying the amount when the wherewithal to do so was
not available, was the far more significant question of whether the defendants’ failure to
honour their undertaking was conduct which was inexcusable. The Commissioner had
argued that a breach of the undertaking was inexcusable due to a conflict of interest the
defendant Mr Bhanabhai had as a shareholder in the two companies that were liable for
the gst debt, and Mr Bhanabhai’s professional obligations as a solicitor acting for the very
same companies. In addition, and more significantly, he was also, personally, a guarantor
of the loan raised from the principal lender to the development project that had been
undertaken by the two companies.
When the principal lender to the project had called up the loan, the directors of the
debtor companies, which included Mr Bhanabhai, had as their pre-eminent concern the
removal of their liability as guarantors of the loan. Accordingly, the defendant solicitor
had, on receipt of the net balances on settlement of the sales of the apartment units, used
the proceeds to reduce his exposure as guarantor of the loan by the principal lender to the
development project. He was able to reduce his liability as guarantor by not paying the
Commissioner the gst impost in respect of the apartment units when the settlements of
the sale transactions in relation to the units had occurred.
The conduct by the defendants’ solicitor amply demonstrated that he had a personal
interest in not honouring the undertaking. This personal interest was in marked contrast
to the obligation he had to honour the undertakings and Laurenson J commented on the
personal obligation that had been imposed on Mr Bhanabhai as follows:
‘Mr Bhanabhai is an experienced solicitor. I do not accept that he would
understand the undertaking to be anything other than a means by which pay-
ment to CIR would be assured. It was not an acceptance by him that he per-
sonally would accept the companies’ liability to pay the GST. It was a promise
by him as a solicitor that he would pay the CIR monies which he received as
a solicitor … He agreed, by means of the undertaking, to provide the mecha-
nism which ensured payment of the liability already accepted by the compa-
nies. That undertaking was acceptable to CIR because it brought with it the
word of a solicitor backed by the reputation of the legal profession.’58
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58 C of IR v Manu Chotubhai Bhanabhai (2005) 22 NZTC 19,533 at 19,557. Towards the end of the judgment,
Laurenson J made the further observation that:
‘When solicitors give undertakings they know that they are placing on the line not only their own profes-
sional credibility, but also that of the legal profession as a whole’ (at 19,570).
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Laurenson J concluded that Mr Bhanabhai’s principal objective had been to ensure repay-
ment of the loan owed to the principal lender to the development project, in order to
reduce his as well as the other co-directors’ liability as guarantors of the loan. In
Laurenson J’s view:
‘this factor alone is sufficient to show that Mr Bhanabhai in this respect had
acted quite inexcusably in his position as a solicitor, and, as such, the Court is
entitled to move on to consider the question of compensation. I should add
that I consider the reason why the obligation was not met was because Mr
Bhanabhai was more concerned to protect his own position as an investor in,
and guarantor of, the companies.’59
Thus it follows from the above that the position adopted by the High Court was to accept
that the facts indicated a clear case where it was impractical to order the defendants to
honour their personal undertaking. However, in accepting this as the reality, the court
nonetheless proceeded to comment on how the defendant’s actions had directly con-
tributed to making it impractical or impossible to honour the undertaking.
As Laurenson J implicitly indicated in the above passage, the fact that it was imprac-
tical to order the performance of the undertaking, meant that it became logical to then
consider the question of compensation. However, in order to properly address the matter
of the quantum of compensation that ought to be ordered, the logical first step was to
examine how culpable the defendants’ conduct had been in directly or indirectly con-
tributing to that state of affairs, whereby it became impossible or impractical to honour
the personal undertaking.60
Laurenson J was also clear that the question of compensation that had to be
addressed in the circumstances and that indeed would have to be ultimately ordered by
the court, was a no less important one. This was because it would directly affect whether
the receiver of an undertaking could rely on one and enforce it if necessary, and the
impact this would have on the integrity of solicitors in honouring their undertakings in
the future. In making an order for compensation of $300,000 in favour of the plaintiff,
Laurenson J commented on the significance of the question of compensation in this pas-
sage of the judgment:
‘The plaintiff was entitled to, and did, rely on the special nature of that solici-
tor’s undertaking … Viewing the matter broadly with the object of achieving
a just result and, at the same time, ensuring that the award of compensation
demonstrates the Court’s intention to preserve the integrity of solicitors’
undertakings, I have concluded that an appropriate award of compensation in
this case should be $300,000.’61
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59 C of IR v Manu Chotubhai Bhanabhai (2005) 22 NZTC 19,533 at 19,558.
60 The plaintiff had claimed in the alternative that by reason of the breach of the undertaking, the conduct of the
defendants in relation to the non-payment of gst was inexcusable and deserving of reproach such that a com-
pensatory order of a disciplinary nature was merited and in respect of which the plaintiff sought compensation
or damages for the loss of the gst payable – see C of IR v Manu Chotubhai Bhanabhai (2005) 22 NZTC 19,533 at
19,560.
61 Ibid at 19,559.
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The solicitor as appellant and his partner as co-appellant, appealed to the New Zealand
Court of Appeal.62 The Court of Appeal upheld the New Zealand High Court decision
that the appellant Bhanabhai had breached the solicitor’s personal undertaking that had
been given. It also upheld the quantum of compensation that had been awarded as a con-
sequence of the breach.
Although the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the High Court, its grounds
for doing so differed slightly from those of the High Court.63 The grounds were slightly
different because of the differing interpretations which had been given to the undertaking
by the two respective courts. The High Court had taken a rather narrow view of the
scope of the undertaking, by limiting the set of obligations that the appellants had under-
taken to perform. Having re-examined the actual wording of the undertaking, the Court
of Appeal expressed the view that there were two possible ways in which the undertak-
ing could be interpreted.64 First, it could be interpreted as not being expressed to be con-
ditional and therefore should not be so construed. Secondly, the undertaking could be
construed as being subject to two conditions, these being that the law firm would retain
instructions from the two company developers in relation to the sale of the units and that
the proceeds of sale of the units would be available in order to pay the gst liability.
The Court of Appeal was satisfied that the High Court had adopted the second
interpretation, namely that the solicitors would pay the Commissioner sums of money
that they would receive as solicitors. The High Court had not interpreted the wording of
the undertaking as an ‘acceptance’ by Mr Bhanabhai ‘that he personally would accept the
companies’ liability to pay the GST’.65
The Court of Appeal also commented that the High Court had interpreted the
undertaking as carrying with it a number of implied obligations. These were to keep the
Commissioner informed if difficulties arose with the implementation of the undertaking,
in addition to the obligation on the solicitor to do all that was required in order to ensure
the undertaking would be honoured. The Court of Appeal opined that the findings by
the High Court Judge against the appellants:
‘were essentially based on his conclusion that Mr Bhanabhai had acted in
breach of these implied associated obligations.’66
However, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal, there was no lawful authority for read-
ing down an unqualified undertaking and the court expressed its view as follows:
‘[T]here is no principle of law which requires an unconditional undertaking in
relation to such events to be read down so as to be conditional upon fulfilment
of the undertaking being possible.’67
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62 Bhanabhai v C of IR (2007) 23 NZTC 21,155.
63 In the Court of Appeal decision in Bhanabhai v C of IR (2007) 23 NZTC 21,155 at 21,163, William Young P
commented:
‘As will become apparent, however, our preferred interpretation of the undertaking is rather different from
that of the Judge.’
64 Ibid at 21,162.
65 Supra note 62 at 21,163.
66 Supra note 62 at 21,163.
67 Supra note 62 at 21,163.
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In the opinion of the Court of Appeal, there were a number of matters in relation to the
factual background which supported the view that the undertaking was unconditional.
Although Mr Bhanabhai had provided the personal undertaking, he had not done so
purely because of the professional connection he had with the development. His connec-
tion went far beyond his professional role as the advising solicitor for the developers.68
This was because he had a financial interest in the development through his indirect
involvement as an investor in it. In addition he had acted as a director of the two devel-
oper companies and therefore was in a position to influence events as a director of the
developers and as one who had an entrepreneurial interest in them. Mr Bhanabhai had
also acted as one of the guarantors for the loan finance that had been advanced by the pri-
mary financier of the development.
There was, accordingly, all the more reason in the opinion of the Court of Appeal
why the undertaking had to be construed in this broad all encompassing manner. The
consequent High Court order for compensation therefore was upheld, which had the
direct result that the solicitor had to pay the amount of compensation that had been
ordered.
The legal effect of court ordered compensation for
breach of solicitors’ undertaking
The defendant, having unsuccessfully exhausted the appellate process69 to have the court
ordered compensation against him overturned, had effectively paved the way for the
Commissioner to commence enforcement action against him. This enforcement action
began by the Commissioner serving a bankruptcy notice on the defendant, as judgment
debtor.70 The bankruptcy notice had as its basis the order for compensation that had been
made by the High Court71 and subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal. The judgment
debtor’s response to the bankruptcy notice was described by the High Court as follows:
‘The judgment debtor, Manu Chotubhai Bhanabhai, took no steps to seek to
have the bankruptcy notice set aside or to challenge the bankruptcy notice.’72
Having taken no action in respect of the bankruptcy notice, the judgment debtor sought
to invoke the court’s jurisdiction, to dismiss the Commissioner’s bankruptcy petition.73
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68 In Bhanabhai v C of IR (2009) 24 NZTC 23,126 at 23,133 Sargisson AJ in the High Court commented that:
‘Mr Bhanabhai had an interest beyond that of legal advisor only, and had signed the undertaking and been a
director of the companies involved. He also had a financial interest in the affairs that were being transacted.’
69 The defendants had applied for leave to the New Zealand Supreme Court to appeal the decision of the New
Zealand Court of Appeal reported as Bhanabhai v C of IR (2007) 23 NZTC 21,155. The application for leave to
appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court in its decision reported as Bhanabhai v C of IR (2007) 23 NZTC
21,274. In the words of Sargisson AJ in Bhanabhai v C of IR (2009) 24 NZTC 23,126 at 23,128: ‘The appeal
process has been exhausted and the Commissioner wishes to proceed with the bankruptcy proceeding.’
70 Bhanabhai v C of IR (2009) 24 NZTC 23,126 at 23,127.
71 In C of IR v Bhanabhai (2005) 22 NZTC 19,533.
72 Bhanabhai v C of IR(2009) 24 NZTC 23,126 at 23,127.
73 Section 26 of the New Zealand Insolvency Act 1967, outlines the discretionary power of the court in respect of
a creditor’s petition, pursuant to which the court may either grant or dismiss the petition. The petition in
Bhanabhai had been filed before the Insolvency Act 2006 had taken effect. The equivalent provisions in the 2006
Act are sections 36 and 37.
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The judgment debtor argued that there were a number of factors74 which arose from the
facts and which accordingly rendered it unjust to permit the Commissioner to rely on the
judgment debt.75
The High Court concluded that the debtor had not made out a case for the exercise
of the court’s discretion to dismiss the petition.76 The Commissioner was expressly per-
mitted to proceed in his action to obtain orders for adjudication against the judgment
debtor, Mr Bhanabhai. However, Sargisson AJ made a number of helpful observations in
respect of solicitors’ personal undertakings in the course of dealing with the arguments
that had been made by the respective parties to the action.
The Commissioner had argued, quite correctly in Sargisson AJ’s view, that the
sum on which the bankruptcy petition had been based did not concern unpaid taxes.
Rather, it concerned a judgment debt which arose due to a breach of a solicitor’s
undertaking.77 Counsel for the Commissioner had also argued that breaching the under-
taking was a  matter which of itself concerned the public interest. In support of this
argument, a  number of authorities were brought to the court’s attention. Two of these
included Re Hayward HC ROT B36/96 3 September 1996, Master Kennedy Grant and
Re Aitcheson HC AK B1235/98 9 July 1999, Salmon J. In essence, the court in these
decisions had held that unless the court adjudicates in the event of failure to honour a
guarantee, the resulting consequence will be the giving of guarantees with impunity
‘because the Court will not hold those who give them to their promises’.78 The
Commissioner submitted that a  similar principle applied in respect of the giving of solic-
itors’ personal undertakings. Sargisson AJ appeared to be impressed by the argument
when commenting as follows:
‘I also accept that there are parallels between the failure to honour a guarantee
and the breach of a solicitor’s undertaking.’79
An additional factor that the judgment debtor raised as one of a number which warranted
dismissal of the petition, was the finding of the Law Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal.
The tribunal had considered a charge of professional misconduct which had been laid by
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74 The main factors raised included the judgment debtor’s standing in the community, the absence of other cred-
itors, the unequal treatment of a joint debtor, his personal interests such as those of his family and employees as
well as the public interest in being deprived of a significant sum of money that could be paid by a relative to
compromise the debt owing to the Commissioner – see Bhanabhai v C of IR (2009) 24 NZTC 23,126 at 23,129.
75 Bhanabhai v C of IR (2009) 24 NZTC 23,126 at 23,128.
76 In Sargisson AJ’s opinion in Bhanabhai v C of IR (2009) 24 NZTC 23,126 at 23,129:
‘The question for determination is whether factors relied on warrant the relief Mr Bhanabhai seeks. For rea-
sons I will come to I am not satisfied he has demonstrated that they do.’ Towards the end of his Honour’s
judgment, His Honour was more emphatic in his comments that:’Quite simply there are no other com-
pelling or sufficient reasons for dismissal of the application for adjudication’ (23,134).
77 Bhanabhai v C of IR (2009) 24 NZTC 23,126 at 23,130.
78 Ibid at 23,131.
79 Ibid. In the earlier High Court decision in C of IR v Manu Chotutbhai, Bhanabhai (2005) 22 NZTC 19,533
Laurenson J expressed the view that an undertaking and guarantee were very similar when commenting that:
‘However, CIR had another avenue to obtain payment … namely the undertaking from the defendants. This
as I see it falls into the same situation as that of a creditor who may have had a guarantee from a third person,
that that person would meet the companies’ debt failing payment by the companies’ (19,552).
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the Auckland District Law Society and related to the judgment debtor’s failure to honour
a solicitor’s personal undertaking. The judgment debtor’s argument was that although the
tribunal had found him guilty of misconduct due to a breach of the undertaking, the
penalty it had imposed supported the retention of his position as a principal of his law
firm. Further, he argued that the tribunal had not been of the view that his misconduct
was of a sufficiently serious nature as to justify interference with his right to practise.
These matters, which related to the Disciplinary Tribunal’s findings, were ones which,
the judgment debtor argued, supported the exercise of the court’s discretion under s 26 of
the Insolvency Act 1967 in his favour.
The Commissioner strenuously argued against this factor, with the essence of the
argument summarised by Sargisson AJ as follows:
‘He argues that the promotion of commercial morality requires adjudication
for breach of the undertaking and this position is supported by the Disciplinary
Tribunal’s reasons for its ruling that Mr Bhanabhai is guilty of professional mis-
conduct. He argues that these reasons, which include the finding that the
debtor deliberately departed from the accepted standards and emphasise the
importance of solicitors’ undertakings being honoured, support a finding of
bankruptcy. He likens the present case, involving as it does a failure to honour
a written undertaking, to cases involving personal guarantees.’80
Thus the Commissioner appeared to have taken a markedly contrasting view regarding
the seriousness with which a breach of such an undertaking ought to be treated. The
judgment debtor seemed to have adopted the view that if a breach merely results in
 censure by the Disciplinary Tribunal, but the penalty for such a finding does not include
or extend in any way to interfering with his right to practise law, that such amounts to a
sufficient penalty for breaching the undertaking. In so arguing, the judgment debtor
appeared to have also expressed the view that the tribunal’s decision in respect of a find-
ing of misconduct was not only sufficient but was also perhaps conclusive. Accordingly,
it seemed implicit in the judgment debtor’s argument that there was no need for a court
to revisit the finding. In other words, if the tribunal had made a finding of misconduct and
provided ample justification for such a finding, that would have concluded the matter for
all intents and purposes, thereby obviating the need for intervention by the court pursuant
to its inherent jurisdiction.
The Commissioner, on the other hand, appeared to have argued that a breach of a
solicitor’s personal undertaking was a far more serious matter that could not be confined
to the technicalities of a finding of misconduct and the imposition of penalties by the
Disciplinary Tribunal. The Commissioner’s argument appeared to be based on the
premise that a breach of a solicitor’s personal undertaking was a matter that went to the
heart of the legal profession and its professional standards, which had as their foundation
the values of trust, honour and integrity. A solicitor’s word must be taken as his or her
bond and he or she must be held to either honouring their undertakings or meeting a
compensation order in lieu. The Commissioner had also argued that the Disciplinary
Solicitors’ personal undertakings for taxation obligations and the implications for solicitors
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Tribunal’s reasons for its finding of misconduct supported the strict view that an under-
taking must be honoured.81
There were perhaps quite sound practical reasons as to why the Commissioner had
so strenuously argued that solicitors’ personal undertakings were commitments that must
be enforced. These may have perhaps included undertakings he had already been given
by solicitors and which he had also accepted in good faith. However, it was also impor-
tant for the Commissioner to know, for purposes of the validity of future undertakings,
whether the law would firmly hold solicitors who gave personal undertakings to their
word. In other words the arguments by the Commissioner in Bhanabhai were rigorously
made as if it were a test case, to ascertain whether the Commissioner could in future rely
on solicitors’ undertakings as an enforcement mechanism for the payment of tax debts, as
well as other obligations of a taxation nature that may have been the subject of a solici-
tor’s personal undertaking.
Having considered the respective arguments regarding the role of the tribunal in
making its finding of misconduct, the court considered that it [the court] continued to
have jurisdiction in the matter in so far as there were limitations on the action that the
 tribunal could lawfully take. The High Court expressed the view that the narrow inter-
pretation argued for by the judgment debtor in regard to the tribunal’s finding of mis-
conduct and the penalty imposed, was untenable. This was because it had the
consequence that the judgment debt remained unpaid and the tribunal lacked authority
to exercise the court’s insolvency jurisdiction.
Sargisson AJ made the significant observation that the position would have been
very different had the judgment debt been paid and the tribunal had acted as it had, in
imposing penalties or sanctions for the breach of the solicitor’s personal undertaking. If
payment had been made, then the fact that the breach of the undertaking had been
 remedied, coupled with the sanctions or penalties imposed by the tribunal, would have
amounted to a sufficient overall remedy commensurate with the gravity of the breach that
had occurred. Had the breach been adequately remedied in this manner, it would also
have had the consequence of obviating any need for the High Court to intervene in terms
of its insolvency jurisdiction.
However, since payment had not been made and the judgment debtor remained
insolvent, this resulted in the inevitable consequence that the High Court had to inter-
vene pursuant to its insolvency jurisdiction. It therefore followed that the judgment
debtor was incorrect in arguing that the Disciplinary Tribunal had adequately dealt with
the matter. This was because the tribunal was only concerned with the judgment debtor’s
failure to honour his undertaking in a professional disciplinary context.82 It did not have,
and therefore could not exercise, the insolvency jurisdiction, the exercise of which
became critically important on the facts. The position was articulated by Sargisson AJ as
follows:
Professional Negligence, Vol. 27 No. 1, 2011
32
81 In Bhanabhai v C of IR (2009) 24 NZTC 23,126 at 23,128, Sargisson AJ’s observations indicated that His
Honour was acutely aware that the breach of the personal undertaking had not only been considered by the
High Court pursuant to its inherent jurisdiction, but it had also been a matter that had been deliberated upon
by the Law Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal. Sargisson AJ in fact expressly reserved leave at the conclusion of
the hearing for the parties to provide written submissions on the tribunal’s decision when it was issued. The par-
ties duly filed their respective submissions, which were taken into account as part of the court’s judgment – see
Bhanabhai v C of IR (2009) 24 NZTC 23,126 at 23,128.
82 Ibid at 23,132.
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‘It is appropriate that he was censured for breach of undertaking, but that
penalty cannot absolve him of what would otherwise be appropriate orders
arising from his insolvency.
In these circumstances, I am not persuaded that the Tribunal’s decision
should be treated as definitive of the question whether Mr Bhanabhai should
be allowed to continue in practice. Mr Bhanabhai is in no better position than
any debtor who is unable to pay a significant debt. He does not deserve better
or more favourable treatment simply because he has been censured and
penalised by the legal profession’s disciplinary body for breach of the under-
taking to pay the debt.’83
An important aspect to note in regard to the Bhanabhai case is that the defendant judg-
ment debtor, in respect of that singular breach, was subjected to disciplinary action and
censure by two separate disciplinary authorities. In other words, for that one singular
breach, the consequence for the defendant solicitor was the predicament of double
 jeopardy, namely disciplinary action by both the Law Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal
pursuant to the then Law Practitioners Act 1982 (the predecessor of the 2006 Act) and
secondly the disciplinary jurisdiction of the High Court over its officers. This statute
which had been in force on the material facts in Bhanabhai that dealt with disciplinary
matters involving solicitors is now no longer in force. It has however, been replaced by
the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 (the 2006 Act). In the aftermath of the
Bhanabhai decision, it is worth examining the relevant provisions of the 2006 Act in order
to ascertain the manner in which this Act now provides for the enforcement of solicitors’
personal undertakings and the relationship, if any, that the 2006 Act’s enforcement
 provisions have with the enforcement regime pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the
High Court.
The enforcement of solicitors’ personal undertakings
pursuant to the 2006 Act
The professional society of which lawyers are members, namely the New Zealand Law
Society,84 has statutory powers that enable it to exercise control over lawyers’ conduct as
professionals. This is pursuant to the recently enacted New Zealand statute, the Lawyers
and Conveyancers Act 200685 (the 2006 Act). A brief examination of relevant provisions
of the 2006 Act becomes quite important, in order to appreciate the current New Zealand
legal framework, pursuant to which there now exists a quite separate and independent
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83 Bhanabhai v C of IR (2009) 24 NZTC 23,126 at 23,132. Counsel for the Commissioner had also submitted that
the fact that one of the judgment debtor’s creditors, namely his accountant, supported the exercise of the court’s
discretion not to adjudge the judgment debtor bankrupt, was not decisive. This factor was significantly out-
weighed by the very large outstanding judgment debt and the fact that Mr Bhanabhai as judgment debtor was
insolvent. In such circumstances, the Commissioner argued, the judgment debtor should not be continuing to
operate a private law practice.
84 Section 63 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 (the 2006 Act), provides that the New Zealand Law
Society, which continued in being pursuant to s 3(1) of the Law Practitioners Act 1982, will continue in being
as the society called the New Zealand Law Society.
85 This Act was passed on 20 March 2006 but did not come into force until 1 August 2008, pursuant to clause 2
of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act Commencement Order 2008 (SR 2008/182).
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statutory procedure, pursuant to which solicitors can be held accountable for their
 professional conduct, including their actions in respect of personal undertakings. It is
important to recognise that this statutory procedure, however, operates so as to leave
undiminished the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to exercise supervision and
control over its officers. The overall legal position in the aftermath of the Bhanabhai
 litigation, therefore, is that the statutory position expressly permits the co-existence of
both the statutory procedure as well as the inherent disciplinary jurisdiction of the High
Court.
The purposes of the 2006 Act86 include the maintenance of public confidence in the
provision of legal services as well as recognition of the status of the legal profession. The
2006 Act proceeds to specify four fundamental obligations87 of lawyers88 which include the
following:
(a) the obligation to uphold the rule of law and to facilitate the administration of justice
in New Zealand;89
(b) the obligation to act in accordance with all fiduciary duties and duties of care owed
by lawyers to their clients;90
(c) the obligation to protect, subject to his or her overriding duties as an officer of the
High Court and to his or her duties under any enactment, the interests of his or her
clients.91
The New Zealand Law Society has, as some of its regulatory functions,92 the following:
(a) to control and regulate the practice in New Zealand by barristers and by barristers
and solicitors of the profession of the law;
(b) to uphold the fundamental obligations imposed on lawyers who provide regulated
services93 in New Zealand;
(c) to monitor and enforce the provisions of the 2006 Act; and of any regulations and
rules made under it, that relate to the regulation of lawyers.
Section 94 of the 2006 Act specifies in mandatory terms the rules which the New Zealand
Law Society is required to have, which include the following:
(e) standards of professional conduct and client care.
(o) the kinds of conduct for which a lawyer or former lawyer may be disciplined.
Pursuant to s 95, the New Zealand Law Society, in exercising the powers conferred by
s 94(e), must have rules that include or provide for a code of professional conduct and
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86 Such purposes as are outlined in s 3 of the 2006 Act.
87 The four fundamental obligations are outlined in s 4 of the 2006 Act.
88 A defined term in s 6 of the 2006 Act which means a person who holds a current practising certificate as a bar-
rister or as a barrister and solicitor.
89 Section 4(a) of the 2006 Act.
90 Section 4(c) of the 2006 Act.
91 Section 4(d) of the 2006 Act.
92 Section 65 lists the 5 regulatory functions of the Society.
93 ‘Regulated services’ is a defined term in s 6 of the 2006 Act and in relation to a lawyer its meaning includes legal
services.
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client care, which is to serve as a reference point for discipline and which would include
a focus on, in the case of lawyers, the duties of lawyers as officers of the High Court and
the duties of lawyers to their clients.
In accordance with sections 94(e), (o) and 95, the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act
(Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, otherwise referred to as the ‘Conduct
and Client Care Rules’, were formally adopted by the New Zealand Law Society with
the approval of the Minister of Justice in accordance with Part 6 of the Act and came into
force on 1 August 2008. These Rules are binding on all lawyers and former lawyers,
whether or not they are members of the New Zealand Law Society.94 Rule 1.5 specifies
that the rules are those required by s 94(e), (j) and (o) of the 2006 Act. It further stipulates
that the Rules also constitute the code of professional conduct and client care required by
s 95 of the 2006 Act.
Chapter 13 of the Conduct and Client Rules deals with obligations on lawyers as
officers of court, while chapter 6 of the Rules deals with client interests. Chapter 7 deals
with the rules on disclosure and communication of information to clients. Of interest is
Chapter 10 with rules governing professional dealings. Rule 10.3 of Chapter 10
 embodies, in statutory language, a requirement that lawyers honour all undertakings
whether oral or written and further stipulates that:
‘A lawyer must honour all undertakings, whether written or oral, that he or
she gives to any person in the course of practice.
10.3.1 This rule applies whether the undertaking is given by the lawyer per-
sonally or by any other member of the lawyer’s practice. This rule applies
unless the lawyer giving the undertaking makes it clear that the undertaking is
given on behalf of a client and that the lawyer is not personally responsible for
its performance.’
Statutory authority for enforcing solicitors’ 
personal undertakings
Section 7 of the 2006 Act defines misconduct in relation to a lawyer as conduct that
 consists of a wilful or reckless contravention of any provision of the 2006 Act or of any
regulations or practice rules made pursuant to it which apply to the lawyer. Rule 1.4 of
Chapter 1 of the Conduct and Client Care Rules then proceeds to specify the kinds of
conduct for which a lawyer may be disciplined, and this includes misconduct as defined
in s 7.
Part 7 of the 2006 Act then proceeds to outline the statutory procedure for the
 laying of complaints against lawyers and the disciplinary procedures that are to follow in
the event of a successful complaint being laid.
In essence, pursuant to the complaints and disciplinary regime under the 2006 Act,
any person may lay a complaint alleging misconduct.95 The complaint is made to a
Complaints Service which the New Zealand Law Society is required to establish for the
purpose of receiving complaints.96 As part of the complaints service, the Law Society is
Solicitors’ personal undertakings for taxation obligations and the implications for solicitors
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95 Section 132 of the 2006 Act.
96 Section 121 of the 2006 Act.
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required to establish at least one Lawyers Standards Committee which has as one of its
functions the inquiry into and investigation of complaints.
The Standards Committee having inquired into a complaint may make determina-
tions97 which include a determination that the matter be considered by the Disciplinary
Tribunal.98 The Disciplinary Tribunal is empowered to hear and determine any charge
against a lawyer that is made to it by a Lawyers Standards Committee99 and if it is satisfied
that the charge has been proven, make one or more orders.100 These include an order that
the lawyer pay to the New Zealand Law Society in respect of any charge laid against him
or her, such sum by way of penalty not exceeding $30,000 as the Disciplinary Tribunal
orders as appropriate.101 Of interest in the range of orders which the tribunal is
 empowered to make, is an order which contrasts with the punitive one provided for in
s 242(l)(i). The tribunal can also make a compensatory order in favour of any person who
has suffered loss by reason of any act or omission of a lawyer.102
To a significant extent, Part 7 of the 2006 Act provides for a detailed statutory pro-
cedure for dealing with complaints and discipline of lawyers by the professional body that
has oversight of the legal profession, namely the New Zealand Law Society. In doing so,
the statutory procedure is outlined in a manner which ensures that it does not in any way
operate so as to displace the inherent jurisdiction103 of the High Court to exercise super-
vision over the conduct of lawyers as officers of the court.
Section 120 of the 2006 Act, which outlines the purposes of Part 7, states one of
those purposes as being:
‘to preserve the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to strike off the roll
and discipline lawyers in their capacity as officers of the High Court.’
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97 Section 152(1) and (2). The Standards Committee seems limited in that it can only make a determination that
there has been unsatisfactory conduct, but cannot make a determination that there has been misconduct. Indeed
the power that a Standards Committee has to make orders pursuant to s 156 is restricted to determinations of
unsatisfactory conduct.
98 A body established pursuant to s 226 of the 2006 Act.
99 Section 227(b).
100 Section 242 .
101 Section 242(l)(i).
102 Section 242(l)(a) includes orders which can be made under s 156, which are orders that a Standards Committee
can make where a determination has been made of unsatisfactory conduct.
103 In Accused (CA 60/97) v Attorney-General (1997) 15 CANZ 148 at 151, Henry J commented on the inherent
jurisdiction of the High Court as follows:
‘The High Court derives its general jurisdiction from its status as a superior Court and in particular from s 16
of the Judicature Act 1908. The latter gives the Court all judicial jurisdiction which may be necessary to
administer the laws of New Zealand. Inherent jurisdiction is the exercise of an ancillary power which is not
conferred by statute or by rules of Court and exists to enable the Court to act effectively within its primary
jurisdiction.’
In R v Moke and Lawrence [1996] 1 NZLR 263 at 267, Thomas J commented on the inherent jurisdiction in
these terms:
‘The Court may invoke its inherent jurisdiction whenever the justice of the case so demands. It is a power,
which may be exercised even in respect of matters, which are regulated by statute or by rules of Court pro-
viding of course, that the exercise of the power does not contravene any statutory provision. The need to do
justice is paramount.’
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Section 268(l) is explicit in its provisions that nothing in the 2006 Act is to affect the
inherent jurisdiction and powers of the High Court over barristers and barristers and
solicitors.
It therefore follows that pursuant to the statutory scheme of the 2006 Act, lawyers
are in effect subject to two distinct jurisdictions in terms of disciplinary matters and with
much justification. First, the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court enables it to regulate
its own procedures and processes in respect of its own officers as and when necessary.
Secondly, the statutory procedure is one designed to uphold the high standards of those
who are members of the profession as represented nationally by the New Zealand Law
Society. As observed by Tipping J in the Court of Appeal decision in Harley v McDonald:104
‘It will usually be more appropriate for the Court itself to deal with breaches
of duty by its officer … rather than referring them to the law society whose
function is directed more to the interests of the profession than those of the
Court … .’
In contrast to the position articulated by Tipping J in Harley v McDonald, it may well be
the case that matters of discipline and supervision may involve much more detailed inves-
tigation and inquiry. This may indicate that the procedures which are likely to be
involved in order to properly deal with the matter may be far more extensive, in which
case the inherent summary jurisdiction of the court may not be suitable or appropriate. In
such cases the matter may well warrant the more comprehensive and detailed inquiry and
investigation which can be undertaken by the Law Society. Lord Hope of Craighead in
his Lordship’s speech in the Privy Council decision in Harley v McDonald105 made refer-
ence to this in the following passage:
‘Fairness to the barrister or solicitor requires that notice should be given of
allegations about breaches of duty which raise these issues and that an oppor-
tunity should be given to them to challenge the allegations, if so advised, by
cross-examining witnesses and leading evidence. These procedures are incon-
sistent with the summary nature of the jurisdiction. Bearing in mind the extra
cost which an investigation of that kind may involve, and the overriding
requirement of fairness to those who are at risk of being penalised, the Court
may well conclude that further investigation under this procedure is not
appropriate. This need not be seen as a surrender by the Court of its respons -
ibility. The client may have other remedies. A complaint may be made to the
Law Society leading to disciplinary sanctions against the barrister or solicitor,
or a claim may be made by the client against the solicitor in damages for
 negligence.’
The importance of the decision in Bhanabhai v C of IR,106 is that not only was the solici-
tor’s personal undertaking enforced pursuant to the court’s inherent jurisdiction, but the
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105 [2001] 2 AC 678 at 704.
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breach of the undertaking had also been brought to the attention of the Law Practitioners
Disciplinary Tribunal. The tribunal had to consider a charge of professional misconduct
that had been brought by the Auckland District Law Society, based on Mr Bhanabhai’s
failure to honour the undertaking. Sargisson AJ reserved leave at the conclusion of the
hearing for the parties to provide written submissions on the tribunal’s decision when it
became available. The parties availed themselves of this opportunity and duly filed writ-
ten submissions which were taken into account in Sargisson AJ’s judgment.107 The hear-
ing presided over by Sargisson AJ was in respect of Mr Bhanabhai’s application to have
the court order that the Commissioner’s bankruptcy petition be dismissed. The petition
was based on a High Court order for payment of compensation for breaching an under-
taking to pay the Commissioner goods and services tax that was due and payable. Thus
Bhanabhai serves as an important reminder of the real prospect of double jeopardy for
breaching a solicitor’s personal undertaking.
The preservation of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to exercise disci-
pline and supervision of the conduct of its officers as recognised by the Lawyers and
Conveyancers Act 2006 (the 2006 Act), clearly indicates the continuing significance of
the court’s enforcement powers in respect of solicitors’ personal undertakings. While the
2006 Act now includes a specific obligation on lawyers to honour their undertakings, the
inherent jurisdiction to enforce such undertakings is left undiminished.
Furthermore, in light of the procedures for inquiry and investigation of complaints
for misconduct which include breaches of solicitors’ personal undertakings as outlined in
the 2006 Act, it may tactically be more prudent to invoke the court’s summary jurisdic-
tion in a suitable case. It would therefore be a prudent course for the Commissioner to
continue accepting solicitors’ personal undertakings for the payment of tax debts, in light
of the new legal framework for the enforcement of such undertakings, pursuant to the
enactment of the 2006 Act. The continued acceptance and enforcement of such under-
takings for the payment of tax debts can prove quite an effective tool in the array of
enforcement powers wielded by the Commissioner, as perhaps lucidly demonstrated in
the C of IR v Manu Chotubhai Bhanabhai & Ors related litigation.108
However, although there are these two parallel avenues for discipline, Bhanabhai
perhaps illustrates a further important point, namely that both avenues can operate in
 tandem and indeed in a complementary manner, particularly if one of the two turns out
to be limited in scope. So, for instance, where the Disciplinary Tribunal for want of juris-
diction or for some other reason cannot, or does not, adequately exercise the extent of the
powers that are necessary in any given case, then the court’s jurisdiction over its officers
would be a necessary jurisdiction to invoke, in order to adequately deal with matters in a
given case. The approach, however, of Sargisson AJ to the complementary manner in
which the two sets of disciplinary procedures were meant to operate was quite instructive
in Bhanabhai v C of IR.109 His Honour accepted that the Law Practitioners Disciplinary
Tribunal was limited in its jurisdiction to exercise the High Court’s insolvency jurisdic-
tion. It was, further, rather unsatisfactory to treat the tribunal’s decision as having
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107 Bhanabhai v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2009) 24 NZTC 23,126.
108 C of IR v Manu Chotubhai Bhanabhai (2005) 22 NZTC 19,533.
Bhanabhai v C of IR (2007) 23 NZTC 21,155.
Bhanabhai v C of IR (2007) 23 NZTC 21,274.
Bhanabhai v C of IR (2009) 24 NZTC 23,126.
109 (2009) 24 NZTC 23,126.
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 adequately dealt with the range of issues that related to Mr Bhanabhai’s right to continue
to practise as a solicitor. However, despite recognising the limited scope of the tribunal as
far as disciplinary matters in respect of solicitors were concerned, Sargisson AJ did not
ignore the tribunal’s decision, but reserved leave at the conclusion of the hearing on the
plaintiff Commissioner’s bankruptcy petition for the parties to provide written submis-
sions on the tribunal’s decision when this became available. The parties in fact filed their
respective written submissions and Sargisson AJ took these into account in his judgment
on the bankruptcy petition.110 This approach by the High Court serves as a pertinent
reminder that despite any actual or perceived shortcomings in one of the two procedures,
the more flexible or comprehensive procedure of the two will defer to the more limited
one, in order to ensure that matters are both fairly and comprehensively dealt with as
 warranted by the circumstances of a particular case.
There was also a more immediate consequence for the defendant solicitor who had
been found to have been in breach of the personal undertaking. This was reflected in the
rather onerous monetary penalty that had been imposed on him and which was in addi-
tion to the amount he had personally undertaken to pay. As observed by Sargisson AJ:
‘In the present case … the debt was incurred during more favourable times and
well before the current economic crisis, moreover it was compounded by Mr
Bhanabhai’s failure to honour the undertaking. That failure resulted in his
 liability for not only the original amount covered by the undertaking but the
interest and other costs111 the Court has ordered him to pay.’112
Conclusion
Solicitors’ personal undertakings play a vital role in the practical outworking of commer-
cial and legal transactions, as well as in litigation before the courts. Provided the solicitor,
in giving such undertakings, acts in a professional capacity, the approach of the law has
long been that persons to whom they are given must be able to rely on them. The law,
accordingly, seeks to achieve the objective of preserving the integrity of such undertak-
ings. Such reliance is essential, if court processes as well as legal and business transactions
are to continue being concluded as efficiently as possible.
The attitude of the law in respect of solicitors’ personal undertakings is reflected first
in the manner in which it intervenes when an undertaking has been breached. Secondly,
the seriousness with which the law deals with such breaches is evident in the severity of
the sanctions it imposes. Legal intervention can occur, first by the New Zealand High
Court, as solicitors are officers of the court. Secondly, intervention may occur by the pro-
fessional society of which all barristers and solicitors are members. This society is the New
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110 Ibid at 23,128.
111 Sargisson AJ provided valuable insight into the interest and costs component when noting that:
‘The bankruptcy notice made demand for payment of $528,000.00 being the certified judgment debt of
$300,000 plus costs awarded of $106,430.00, disbursements of $28,775.00 and interest of $91,479.75. The
notice also includes a demand for interest on the certified amount at 7.5% per annum, from the date of judg-
ment to the date of payment.’
– see Bhanabhai v C of IR (2009) 24 NZTC 23,126 at 23,127.
112 Supra note 107 at 23,134.
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Zealand Law Society, pursuant to the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006. The law
society is empowered by statutory authority to intervene if misconduct has been estab-
lished, and the 2006 Act provides that a breach of a solicitor’s personal undertaking
amounts to misconduct.
Despite there being a breach of a solicitor’s undertaking, if it can still be honoured,
the High Court, in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction over solicitors, can order
that the undertaking be honoured. However, where the undertaking has been rendered
impossible to perform, such impossibility will not absolve the solicitor from any loss
 arising from the failure to perform the undertaking. In such a case, a court order for com-
pensation against the solicitor will in all likelihood be made. The case for a court order for
compensation will become increasingly compelling where a solicitor has, by his or her
deliberate conduct, rendered it impossible to honour the undertaking. Such conduct may
have the additional consequence of denying a claim by the defaulting solicitor for
 indemnity under the solicitor’s professional indemnity insurance policy. This rejection of
a professional indemnity insurance claim may occur on the basis that such conduct that
led to breaching the undertaking was intentionally dishonest.
Solicitors’ personal undertakings can also be given to the Commissioner in respect
of taxation obligations, which can include payment of taxation debts. The courts’
approach is to interpret them in a very broad manner in accordance with their clear word-
ing. The set of court decisions in the Bhanabhai related litigation vividly illustrates the
 singular determination with which the Commissioner will pursue solicitors who have
given personal undertakings to pay taxation debts but have chosen to dishonour them. A
noteworthy feature in Bhanabhai may have been the indulgence shown by the
Commissioner in accepting the personal undertaking for the deferred payment of taxation
debt which had become legally due but remained outstanding and was significantly in
arrears. This deferral of payment was an additional concession to an earlier one, whereby
the Commissioner could have pursued the liquidation of the two defaulting taxpayer
companies but had chosen not to.
Despite these major concessions by the Commissioner, the solicitor nonetheless still
chose to dishonour the undertaking. In taking advantage of the indulgence shown by the
Commissioner, the solicitor acting in breach did so to his own serious personal and
 professional detriment. Accordingly, Bhanabhai will continue to serve as a poignant
reminder of the consequences that can be unleashed when an undertaking is given before
satisfactorily resolving a conflict between a solicitor’s personal and professional interests. It
was an act of foolhardiness for an experienced solicitor to have provided a personal under-
taking for corporate taxpayers’ taxation debts, when the solicitor simultaneously had a
direct interest in the commercial viability and fortunes of those very taxpayers.
The result in Bhanabhai would certainly have emboldened the Commissioner to
accept, with renewed vigour, solicitors’ personal undertakings for taxpayers’ tax indebt-
edness. Such undertakings will, however, assume a special significance in the current eco-
nomic climate, particularly when corporate and other taxpayers could well be struggling
to meet their tax obligations in a timely manner. There is also the very real prospect in
such trying financial circumstances, that individual and corporate taxpayers will seek to
forestall bankruptcy and liquidation action against them by the Commissioner on account
of their tax debts. This would occur by arrangements being entered into, whereby their
respective solicitors would provide undertakings to the Commissioner for meeting such
taxpayers’ indebtedness in lieu of enforcement action being taken against such taxpayers.
This could have a positive effect, as it would secure valuable time for a taxpayer in which
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to improve the taxpayer’s financial and/or tax position while avoiding bankruptcy or liq-
uidation action by the Commissioner. In order to secure such assistance from their solic-
itors however, taxpayers will need to be able to reassure their solicitors that they can
either trade their way out of financial difficulty or make alternative arrangements to meet
their tax indebtedness. In other words, if solicitors decide to provide personal undertak-
ings to the Commissioner for tax debts, they will first need to have satisfied themselves
that a taxpayer had a realistic prospect of meeting his tax indebtedness given a period of
time. Where taxpayers cannot provide their solicitors with such reassurance, solicitors will
increasingly be compelled to consider the very real risk of having to honour the under-
taking or having it enforced against them personally. The positive consequence may well
be that only taxpayers who can provide their solicitors with such reassurance will be able
to obtain the benefit of their solicitors’ undertaking. Those taxpayers in financial strife that
are not able to provide such reassurance will be vulnerable to enforcement action, includ-
ing bankruptcy proceedings. It may ultimately prove beneficial to the Commissioner, and
indeed be justifiable, to embark on such proceedings knowing that in doing so, such tax-
payers did not have any viable prospect of redeeming themselves from their dire state of
tax indebtedness.
Obtaining a solicitor’s personal undertaking for taxpayers’ indebtedness provides the
Commissioner with a direct enforcement right against solicitors for the taxation liabilities
of third parties. Further, it may not necessarily invariably be the case that solicitors pro-
viding such undertakings will themselves become insolvent because of actions stemming
from serious lapses of judgment as occurred in Bhanabhai. The fact that Bhanabhai demon-
strates that undertakings given to the Commissioner will be enforced, may lead to solici-
tors that provide such undertakings being serious about honouring them when called
upon to do so. Bhanabhai serves as a salutary reminder that the costs to solicitors for being
in breach of their personal undertakings would far outweigh the costs of otherwise acting
as officers of the court and commensurately honouring their undertakings, as indeed the
law requires them to – and doing so in the interests of all concerned.
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